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Abstract
In reinforcement learning (RL), the duality between exploitation and exploration has long been an important issue. This paper presents a
new method that controls the balance between exploitation and exploration. Our learning scheme is based on model-based RL, in which the
Bayes inference with forgetting effect estimates the state-transition probability of the environment. The balance parameter, which
corresponds to the randomness in action selection, is controlled based on variation of action results and perception of environmental change.
When applied to maze tasks, our method successfully obtains good controls by adapting to environmental changes. Recently, Usher et al.
[Science 283 (1999) 549] has suggested that noradrenergic neurons in the locus coeruleus may control the exploitation–exploration balance
in a real brain and that the balance may correspond to the level of animal’s selective attention. According to this scenario, we also discuss a
possible implementation in the brain. q 2002 Elsevier Science Ltd. All rights reserved.
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1. Introduction
Reinforcement learning (RL) (Sutton & Barto, 1998)i sa
learning framework in order to adapt to an environment
based on trial and error. This paper discusses an RL scheme
for dynamic environments, i.e. environments that change
with time. Conventional RL schemes are formulated in
terms of Markov decision process (MDP), that is, a
decision-making problem or an optimal control problem in
a stochastic but static environment. Since an optimal control
problem in a dynamic environment can approximately be
formulated as an MDP when RL is faster than the
environmental change, this study also adopts that approxi-
mation. In addition, we also use a formulation of partially
observable Markov decision process (POMDP). A POMDP
assumes that the environment involves unobservable
information, typically, unobservable state variables.
Although RL is a machine learning framework, recent
studies (Schultz, Dayan, & Montague, 1997; Waelti,
Dickinson, & Schultz, 2001) showed that in a real brain a
dopaminergic system including the basal ganglia and the
frontal cortex seems to realize a similar learning scheme.
Doya (2000b) has suggested that parameters used in RL,
which are called ‘meta-parameters’, may correspond to
neuromodulators such as serotonin, noradrenaline and
acetylcholine. Thus, the motivation of our study is not
only on the machine learning but also on the brain learning.
In RL, an agent is provided by the environment with a
scalar reward corresponding to a behavior (action) for each
sensory state. The reward indicates instantaneous goodness
of the action at the state. The objective of the agent is to
maximize the rewards accumulated toward the future, and
the maximization is done by improving its strategy to select
an action for each state. Such a strategy is called a policy.
The estimation and prediction of the accumulated rewards
are important for improving the policy. Therefore, a
standard RL scheme estimates the reward accumulation
which is called the value function.
In order to make a good prediction, it is important to
know the dynamics of the environment, i.e. how the current
state changes by an action. Model-free RL methods like the
actor–critic learning (Barto, Sutton, & Anderson, 1983) and
the Q-learning (Watkins & Dayan, 1992) require no model
of the environmental dynamics; instead, they try to directly
estimate the value function. In contrast, model-based RL
methods (Dayan & Sejnowski, 1996; Dearden, Friedman, &
Andre, 1999; Doya, 2000a; Matsuno, Yamazaki, Matsuda,
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PII: S0893-6080(02)00056-4
Neural Networks 15 (2002) 665–687
www.elsevier.com/locate/neunet
* Corresponding author. Tel.: þ81-743-72-5980; fax: þ81-743-72-5989.
E-mail address: ishii@is.aist-nara.ac.jp (S. Ishii).& Ishii, 2001; Moore & Atkeson, 1993; Sutton, 1990) try to
model the environmental dynamics and the value function is
approximated using the model. Especially when the
environment is complicated, e.g. partially observable, a
model-based RL has an advantage, because the environ-
mental model can explicitly deal with the complexity. A
model-based RL learns faster than a model-free alternate.
Our study presents a model-based RL method using the
Bayes inference.
If the agent knows the correct optimal value function
including the correct estimation of the environmental
dynamics, the optimal policy is the one that just selects a
‘greedy’ action that maximizes the value function at each
state. If the estimation and prediction are fairly good,
therefore, a good policy is the one that selects a greedy
action; this is called exploitation. During the process of trial
and error, however, the agent does not know the correct
optimal value function. Especially in a POMDP, an
approximated value function may be apart from the correct
optimal one, due to the uncertain estimation of unobservable
state variables. In such a situation, the greedy action is not
necessarily optimal. In addition, when the environment
changes with time, the value function approximated using
the past experiences will not be optimal. In order to know
the optimal value function, the agent should execute trial
actions, i.e. actions that are not optimal with respect to the
current value function; this is called exploration. Since these
two strategies, exploitation and exploration, cannot be
operated at once, their control has long been an important
issue in the control ﬁelds (Fe’ldbaum, 1965).
Methods for exploration can roughly be classiﬁed into
two: undirected exploration methods and directed explora-
tion methods (Thrun, 1992). Undirected exploration
methods try to explore the whole state–action space by
assigning positive probabilities to all possible actions. For
example, semi-uniform (e-greedy) exploration and the
Boltzmann exploration (Sutton & Barto, 1998)a r e
undirected methods.
Directed exploration methods use the statistics obtained
through the past experiences in order to execute efﬁcient
exploration. Kearns and Singh (1998) proposed an explora-
tion algorithm called E
3 algorithm, in which states were
classiﬁed into known or unknown states based on the visit
number. At a known state the agent executes directed
exploration under a speciﬁc condition, while at an unknown
state the agent mainly executes undirected exploration. R-
max algorithm by Brafman and Tennenholtz (2001) is a
modiﬁcation of the E
3 algorithm so that the agent executes
directed ‘optimistic’ exploration at an unknown state.
Exploration bonus is one popular technique for directed
exploration. In Sutton’s DYNA system (Sutton, 1990),
exploration bonus is added to the immediate reward based
on the time period that has passed since the state–action pair
was previously experienced. Kaelbling (1993) proposed the
interval estimation algorithm using exploration bonus based
on the upper bound of the conﬁdence interval for the value
function. Moore and Atkeson (1993) also proposed
exploration bonus in their learning algorithm called
prioritized sweeping. In this method, an unfamiliar state is
connected to a ﬁctitious absorbing state with a high value
and the agent is encouraged to visit such unfamiliar states.
In the method by Dayan and Sejnowski (1996), due to the
forgetting effect of the environmental dynamics, the agent
comes to try an action that is not optimal with respect to the
current estimation of the value function.
We discuss in this paper a new control method of the
exploitation–exploration balance. The balance control was
also studied by Thrun (1992). Our method is mainly an
undirected method, in which the balancing parameter is
controlled depending on the current state. Our method also
uses exploration bonus. Usher, Cohen, Servan-Schreiber,
Rajkowski, and Aston-Jones (1999) has suggested that the
exploitation–exploration balance in a real brain may be
controlled by noradrenergic neurons in the locus coeruleus
(LC) and that the balance may correspond to the level of
animal’s selective attention. According to this scenario, we
will discuss a possible implementation in the brain, which
realizes our learning scheme.
Section 2 describes preliminaries to the RL. We propose
in Section 3 a Bayes inference method for identifying the
current environment. We next propose in Section 4 a control
method of the exploitation–exploration balance. An
exploration bonus is also introduced in the same section.
Section 5 shows computer simulation results. Section 6
discusses a possible implementation in the brain, and
Section 7 concludes the paper.
2. Reinforcement learning preliminaries
2.1. Markov decision process
We ﬁrst consider Markov environments; Pðs0ls;aÞ gives
the probability of reaching state s0 by selecting action a at
state s. If the state-transition probability Pðs0ls;aÞ is known,
the value function for state s, V(s), should satisfy the
following (optimal) Bellman’s equation:
VðsÞ¼max
a Qðs;aÞ; ð1aÞ
Qðs;aÞ ; rðs;aÞþg
X
s0
Pðs
0ls;aÞVðs
0Þ: ð1bÞ
Qðs;aÞ is often called the action-value function. The reward
function rðs;aÞ deﬁnes the immediate reward for a state–
action pair ðs;aÞ: The reward function is assumed to be
deterministic for simplicity, although the extension to
stochastic reward functions is straightforward. 0 # g # 1
is a discount constant. The value function deﬁnes the
summation of the discounted rewards accumulated toward
the future. The action-value function Qðs;aÞ represents the
reward accumulation when the agent takes action a at state s
and the optimal actions at the subsequent states.
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state s; a policy is called optimal when it outputs the action
maximizing Qðs;aÞ: The objective of RL, which is often
termed MDP, is to obtain the optimal policy. When the
state-transition probability Pðs0ls;aÞ is known, this problem
can be solved by a dynamic programming approach. In
many RL problems, however, the state-transition prob-
ability is unknown. Temporal-difference (TD) learning
(Sutton, 1988) tries to approximate the value function
based on the agent’s experiences without directly modeling
the environment; it is a model-free approach. The actor–
critic learning (Barto et al., 1983) and the Q-learning
(Watkins & Dayan, 1992) are model-free TD learning. TD
learning makes use of the so-called TD-error:
d ¼ð rðs;aÞþgVðs
0ÞÞ 2 VðsÞ: ð2Þ
The second term is the value of state s based on the present
prediction, while the ﬁrst term is the value of state–action
pair ðs;aÞ using one-ply actual state transition to s0; the TD-
error is the difference between them. TD learning tries to
approximate the value function by decreasing probabilisti-
cally the TD-error based on a stochastic approximation
method (Sutton, 1988). Then, the state-transition probability
is indirectly obtained.
On the other hand, model-based RL (Dayan &
Sejnowski, 1996; Doya, 2000a; Moore & Atkeson, 1993;
Sutton, 1990) tries to directly model the environment by
approximating the state-transition probability Pðs0ls;aÞ
based on experiences of past state transitions. The model-
based RL is suitable for dealing with partially observable
environments and/or dynamic environments. It is also
suitable for multiagents environments (Matsuno et al.,
2001). In the model-based RL, the learning of the value
function and the learning of the environmental model are
conducted concurrently but independently.
2.2. Partially observable Markov decision process
Since the problems considered in our study can be
formulated as POMDPs (Kaelbling, Littman, & Cassandra,
1998), we explain the notion.
A typical POMDP deals with a Markov environment
with unobservable (hidden) state variables. Let s ; ðy;zÞ be
an environmental state, where y and z denote observable and
unobservable state variables, respectively. Due to the
unobservable variables, the environment with respect to
the observable variables does not have a Markov property.
Although standard RL algorithms have often been applied
even to POMDPs by ignoring unobservable variables, such
a ‘naive’ approach is sometimes very slow (Singh, Jaakkola,
& Jordan, 1994). Another way to deal with a POMDP is
called a belief state MDP, in which the (optimal) Bellman’s
equation is given by
VðbÞ¼max
a
Qðb;aÞ; ð3aÞ
Qðb;aÞ ; rðb;aÞþg
X
b0
Pðb
0lb;aÞVðb
0Þ: ð3bÞ
The difference from the MDP Bellman’s equations (1a) and
(1b) is that state s is replaced by a belief state b. A belief
state is represented by estimated probability distribution
of states. Since there is no probabilistic factor for the
observable variables, b ¼½ y; ^ PðzÞ  where ^ PðzÞ is the
estimated probability distribution of the unobservable state
variables. We assume that a state estimator (SE) is able to
estimate a new belief state b0, after the agent experiences a
state transition from the previous belief state b by an action
a and at a new state it observes y0; i.e. SEðb;a;y0Þ ; b0 ¼
½y0; ^ P0ðzÞ : It should be noted that the probability distribution
of the unobservable variables, ^ PðzÞ; may change after the
new observation. In addition, we assume for simplicity that
the reward function does not depend on the unobservable
variables. In this case, Eqs. (3a) and (3b) becomes
Vð½y; ^ PðzÞ Þ ¼ max
a Qð½y; ^ PðzÞ ;aÞ; ð4aÞ
Qð½y; ^ PðzÞ ;aÞ¼rðy;aÞþg
X
y0
Pðy
0l½y; ^ PðzÞ ;aÞVð½y
0; ^ P
0ðzÞ Þ:
ð4bÞ
This study assumes a ﬁnite world; both the state and action
spaces are discrete and ﬁnite. Even in such a ﬁnite world, the
belief state MDPs (4a) and (4b) is hard to solve, because the
belief state value function is deﬁned for the probability
distribution of the unobservable variables and is often
intractable. Therefore, we need an approximation. If an RL
agent is certain of the estimation of the unobservable
variables, ½y; ^ PðzÞ  is equivalent to ½y;^ z ; where ^ z denotes the
most probable value of z. With this approximation,
Vð½y;^ z Þ ¼ max
a Qð½y;^ z ;aÞ; ð5aÞ
Qð½y;^ z ;aÞ¼rðy;aÞþg
X
y0
Pðy
0l½y; ^ PðzÞ ;aÞVð½y
0;^ z
0 Þ: ð5bÞ
This approximation may not be appropriate when the RL
agent is not certain of the estimation of the unobservable
variables. Namely, when the uncertainty of the unobserv-
able variables is high, the ‘best’ policy based on the
approximated Bellman’s equations (5a) and (5b) may not
actually be optimal. Considering this problem, we will later
propose an additional mechanism called exploration bonus.
3. Model of environment
For the time being, we assume that there exists one
unobservable multinomial variable z in the environment.
The distribution of the variable, ^ PðzÞ; is estimated by a
Bayes inference.
Fig. 1 shows an example problem. This is a very simple
maze task; the agent is required to get to a goal point (G)
from a start point (S). There may be a barrier denoted by the
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agent. The existence of the barrier can be ‘perceived’ when
the agent fails to go beyond the barrier. If the existence of
the barrier is regarded as a stochastic event, then it is a
binomial event. The shortest path needs only one step
without the barrier, while it needs three steps with the
barrier. This problem can be formulated in two ways. One is
a stochastic MDP, in which the existence of the barrier is a
stochastic nature of the environment. The other is a
deterministic POMDP, in which the barrier existence is
described by an unobservable variable, and if the agent is
able to observe all the variables including the barrier
existence, the environment is deterministic. We ﬁrst explain
our method to identify the environment according to the
formulation of a deterministic POMDP. After that, we
discuss according to the formulation of a stochastic MDP.
3.1. Bayes inference of multinomial model
If there are M possible values for the unobservable
variable z, it is represented by an M-dimensional vector;
zi [ {0;1} ði ¼ 1;…;MÞ and
PM
i¼1 zi ¼ 1: zi ¼ 1 indicates z
takes the ith value. Let parameter g ; ðg1;…;gMÞ deﬁne a
probabilistic model of the multinominal model. From its
deﬁnition,
PM
i¼1 gi ¼ 1: In the maze example ðM ¼ 2Þ; z1 ¼
1 and z2 ¼ 1 indicate the existence and non-existence of the
barrier, respectively, and g1 and g2 denote the probabilities
of the existence and non-existence, respectively. After
observing T events for the multinomial variable, Z ;
{zðtÞlt ¼ 1;…;T}; the likelihood of the events is given by
PðZlgÞ¼
Y T
t¼1
Y M
i¼1
g
ziðtÞ
i ¼ exp T
X M
i¼1
kzilDlog gi
 !
; ð6Þ
where kzilD ; ð1=TÞ
PT
t¼1 ziðtÞ: Eq. (6) indicates that the
likelihood of the multinomial variable has an exponential
form; the sufﬁcient statistics is TkzilD and the natural
parameter is log gi.
A Bayes inference considers the posterior distribution of
the parameter, P(glZ). A convenient method for the Bayes
inference is that a trial posterior Q(g) is prepared to
approximate the true posterior P(glZ) and the following
variational free energy is maximized with respect to the trial
posterior:
FðQÞ¼
ð
QðgÞlog
PðZlgÞPðgÞ
QðgÞ
dg; ð7Þ
where P(g) is a prior distribution for parameter g. If the trial
posterior includes the true posterior, as a consequence of the
maximization, the Kullback–Leibler (KL) divergence
between the trial posterior and the true posterior becomes
zero; namely, the two probabilistic distributions are
equivalent to each other. The maximization is easily
achieved by taking the variational condition: dF=dQ ¼ 0:
A detailed explanation is described in Appendix A.
If we assume a natural conjugate posterior distribution
for parameter g, the posterior distribution becomes a
Dirichlet distribution (Heckerman, 1999):
QðglnÞ¼exp
X M
i¼1
ni log gi 2 FðnÞ
 !
; ð8Þ
where n ; ðn1;…;nMÞ is a hyperparameter
1 that speciﬁes
the parameter distribution, and FðnÞ is the normalization
term.
If no a priori knowledge on the prior distribution PðgÞ is
available, it is natural to choose a non-informative prior. In
the maze example, a non-informative prior means that the
agent has no a priori idea about the barrier existence and it
considers Pðg1Þ¼Pðg2Þ¼1=2: With a non-informative
prior, the exact Bayes inference is given by
ni ¼ TkzilD; ð9Þ
with Eq. (8). The parameter expectation with respect to the
Dirichlet posterior distribution is given by
  gi ;
ð
giQðglnÞdg ¼
ni þ 1
X M
j¼1
nj þ M
: ð10Þ
Using Eq. (9), expectation (10) becomes
  gi ¼
TkzilD þ 1
T þ M
: ð11Þ
In our POMDP formulation (Eqs. (5a) and (5b)), the
estimation of ^ PðzÞ and ^ z is necessary. ^ Pðzi ¼ 1Þ is estimated
as   gi ði ¼ 1;…;MÞ; and ^ z is estimated as zk ¼ 1 (signifying
the kth value) such that k ¼ arg maxi   gi: This batch
estimation is appropriate when the environment is static.
In a dynamic environment, however, the estimation should
be done in an on-line manner.
3.2. On-line learning and forgetting
In a dynamic environment, an inference based on
observations in the past may not be correct due to the
environmental change. Therefore, the inference should put
an emphasis on recent observations. Such an inference can
be done by deﬁning a weighted variational free energy
Fig. 1. An example maze with a 2 £ 2 grid. ‘S’ and ‘G’ denote the start
point and the goal point, respectively. The thick dotted line denotes an
invisible bi-directional barrier that exists probabilistically.
1 Note that a hyperparameter is different in its notion from a meta-
parameter.
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FðQltÞ ; thðTÞ
X T
t¼1
Y T
u¼tþ1
lðuÞ
 ! ð
QðgÞlog PðzðtÞlgÞdg
þ
ð
QðgÞlog
PðgÞ
QðgÞ
dg; ð12Þ
where hðTÞ¼½
PT
t¼1 ð
QT
u¼tþ1 lðuÞÞ 21 is the normalization
term. The time-dependent discount factor lðtÞð 0 # lðtÞ #
1Þ is scheduled so that it approaches 1 as t increases; e.g.
1 2 lðtÞ , 1=t: Since the weight value for a data point
becomes small as time passes, Eq. (12) puts an emphasis on
recent data. In other words, it introduces ‘forgetting’ effect
on old data. The weighted variational free energy thus
introduces an on-line Bayes inference. In addition, para-
meter t corresponds to the effective data number in the
weighted free energy. If t is smaller than T, the new free
energy (12) respects the prior more than the original free
energy. Namely, parameter t balances the weight of the
likelihood against the prior. Since our Bayes inference uses
a non-informative prior, the decrease of parameter t means
a random inference of the unobservable variable; namely, it
corresponds to further forgetting effect on past perceptions
of the unobservable variable.
Based on the discussion above, we use the following
Bayes inference method instead of the original one given by
Eq. (9):
ni ¼ tkzilðtÞ; ð13aÞ
t
new U
t
old þ 1 ðafter one perception of variable zÞ
k·t
old ðafter an episodeÞ
(
;
ð13bÞ
where the sufﬁcient statistics after the tth perception, k zil(t),
is calculated in an on-line manner (Sato, 2001):
kzilðtÞ¼ð 1 2 hðtÞÞkzilðt 2 1ÞþhðtÞziðtÞ; ð14aÞ
hðtÞ¼ð 1 þ lðtÞ=hðt 2 1ÞÞ
21: ð14bÞ
The effective data number t is incremented after a single
perception of the unobservable variable. After an episode,
however, t value for every unobservable variable is
decreased by a discount factor 0 , k # 1 which is the
forgetting coefﬁcient. Here, an ‘episode’ denotes a series of
state transitions, typically from a start state to an end state.
Accordingly, the SE estimates
^ Pðzi ¼ 1Þ¼  gi ¼
tkzil þ 1
t þ M
; ð15Þ
where kzil is the current sufﬁcient statistics. ^ z is estimated as
zk ¼ 1s u c ht h a tk ¼ arg maxi   gi: If the unobservable
variable has often been perceived, the corresponding
effective data number becomes large. In this case, the
inference by Eq. (15) almost becomes that by maximum
likelihood; this is natural because the agent has much and
recent knowledge on the unobservable variable. In contrast,
if variable z has not been perceived lately, the corresponding
effective data number becomes small. The inference
becomes random in this case because the agent has little
recent knowledge on the unobservable variable and it is
natural for the agent to guess that its value may change
during his absence. In the maze example, the agent becomes
uncertain of the barrier existence if the agent has not tried to
go beyond the barrier lately. The agent assumes that the
unobservable variable, i.e. the environment, will change
with time-constant 1=ð1 2 kÞ:
It should be noted that our Bayes formulation can use an
informative prior instead of the non-informative prior.
Dayan and Sejnowski (1996) used an informative prior (the
barrier will disappear with a high probability) in order to
encourage the agent’s exploration (attempting to go beyond
the barrier).
3.3. Inference of state transition
In the example maze task, the probability that the start
state reaches the goal state by an action ‘go east’ is identical
to the probability of the barrier existence. Namely, the
probability of the unobservable variable is equivalent to the
state-transition probability. Therefore, the above-mentioned
Bayes inference of the unobservable variables is naturally
extended to the inference of the state transitions.
Let S and A denote the set of states and the set of actions,
respectively. Pðsilsj;aÞ denotes the probability that state
sj [ S reaches state si [ S by action a [ A: Here, we
consider events with a ﬁxed state–action pair ðsj;aÞ: A
multinomial variable z signiﬁes an occurrence of a single
state-transition event. If there are M possible states that are
reachable from the state–action pair, z is represented by an
M-dimensional vector; if a state transition event to state
si [ S occurs, zi ¼ 1; zk ¼ 0 ðk – iÞ: Parameter gi deﬁnes a
probabilistic model of the multinomial model. In the
example maze, when the agent tries to ‘go east’ (a ¼ ‘go
east’) at the start point ðsj ¼ SÞ; the possible new state (si)i s
either the goal point or the start point.
Like in the discussion in Section 3.2, the state-transition
probability Pðsilsj;aÞ is estimated as   gi given by Eq. (15),
i.e. ^ Pðsilsj;aÞ¼  gi: The effective data number t is updated
by
t
new U
t
old þ 1 ðaction a is selected at state sjÞ
k·t
old ðafter an episodeÞ
8
<
: ; ð16Þ
instead of Eq. (13b). Eq. (15) means that ^ Pðsilsj;aÞ
approaches the maximum likelihood estimation kzil, as the
effective data number t increases. When the effective data
number is small, on the other hand, the estimation nearly
becomes 1/M, implying that the transition is regarded as
random for every possible new state. Thus, the estimation
reﬂects the information amount that the agent has. Note that
t denotes the effective data number of a state–action pair
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individually.
3.4. Model-based reinforcement learning
The discussions above suggest that the inference of the
state transition is equivalent to the inference of the
unobservable variables, at least in the case of the example
maze task.
In this study, we use a model-based RL method, in which
Eq. (5b) is replaced by
Qð½y;^ z ;aÞ¼rðy;aÞþg
X
y0
^ Pðy
0ly;aÞVð½y
0;^ z
0 Þ; ð17Þ
where ^ Pðy0ly;aÞ is determined by the method described in
Section 3.3. In a deterministic POMDP, this is equivalent to
that the SE conducts a Bayes inference of the unobservable
variables. In a stochastic MDP, the model-based RL
estimates the model of the stochastic environment based
on a Bayes inference.
This model-based RL method can be applied to more
general problems, like stochastic POMDPs; namely, the
state transition is stochastic and there are unobservable
variables. For example, provided in the maze example that
each action is emitted or not with probability p or 1 2 p,
respectively, and an emitted action is effective (i.e. changes
the agent’s state) if there is no barrier in the moving
direction. This task can be formulated as a stochastic
POMDP.
In the model-based RL method, even in such a case, the
state transition for the observable state variable y, ^ Pðy0ly;aÞ;
is estimated by a Bayes inference, regarding the existence of
the unobservable variables as stochastic nature of the
environment. It should be noted that our model-based RL is
not a naive MDP approximation, because the value function
and the action-value function consider the estimation of the
unobservable variables, ^ z:
4. Control of randomness in action selection
Although the objective of RL is to obtain the optimal
policy that maximizes the value function (Eq. (1a) or (5a)), a
simple maximization procedure often results in a semi-
optimal policy and the lack of adaptability to the
environmental change. This section discusses the way to
overcome this problem. Although we assume a ﬁnite world,
equations in this section often use integral notations for
description convenience. In this section, ½y;^ z  is represented
as s.
4.1. Inverse-temperature
We deﬁne a stochastic policy p by a conditional
probability PpðalsÞ of action a for state s. From its
deﬁnition,
Ð
PpðalsÞda ¼ 1: Using the current action-value
function, which may differ from the really optimal one, the
greedy policy maximizes
ð
Qðs;aÞP
pðalsÞda: ð18Þ
Especially when the state and action spaces are ﬁnite, the
greedy policy will assign probability zero to the possible
actions except one or several. Then, it becomes difﬁcult for
the agent to adapt its policy to the environmental change,
and/or to improve the present best (i.e. semi-optimal)
policy. This is one aspect of the exploitation–exploration
problem.
In order to preserve the exploration ability of the policy,
we deﬁne the free energy
2
JðP
pÞ¼
ð
Qðs;aÞP
pðalsÞda 2
1
b
ð
P
pðalsÞlog P
pðalsÞda:
ð19Þ
The ﬁrst and second terms in Eq. (19) are called the energy
term and the entropy term, respectively. The coefﬁcient of
the entropy, 1/b, is called the (thermo-dynamical) tempera-
ture. b is then called the inverse-temperature. If the
temperature is large, the randomness of the probability
P
p(als) is large; namely, the policy becomes random and
hence exploration is encouraged. If the temperature is small,
the policy randomness becomes small so that exploitation is
encouraged. Therefore, the inverse-temperature parameter
b controls the balance between exploitation and explora-
tion. Since the way many parameters of the agent are
changed by learning is dependent on the parameter b, b is
called a meta-parameter (Doya, 2000b).
Using the variational method, the maximization of the
free energy J(P
p) with respect to the stochastic policy
P
p(als) is achieved by
P
pðalsÞ¼
expðbQðs;aÞÞ Ð
expðbQðs;aÞÞda
; ð20Þ
which is called the soft-max policy or the Boltzmann policy
(Sutton & Barto, 1998). When the inverse-temperature
meta-parameter is small, the soft-max policy randomly
selects one of the possible actions. When the inverse-
temperature parameter is large, in contrast, it selects the
greedy action that maximizes the current action-value
function.
4.2. Local control of randomness
A constant inverse-temperature means that the random-
ness induced by the entropy is constant against the energy
term, while the energy term depends on the variation of the
action-value function. For example, if the action-value
function for a certain state s does not vary with respect to
action a, on one hand, the soft-max policy becomes random
2 Although we use the words ‘free energy’ for Eq. (7) or (12), and (19),
their deﬁnitions are different from each other.
S. Ishii et al. / Neural Networks 15 (2002) 665–687 670even with a large b. If the action-value function signiﬁ-
cantly varies, on the other hand, the soft-max policy likely
selects the greedy action even with a small b. The policy
randomness is thus dependent on the variation of the action-
value function with respect to possible actions.
By considering the variation of the action-value function,
we deﬁne a normalized soft-max policy:
P
pðalsÞ¼
expðb0 ~ Qðs;aÞÞ
Ð
expðb0 ~ Qðs;aÞÞda
; ð21aÞ
~ Qðs;aÞ ;
Qðs;aÞ 2 E½Qðs;aÞ 
ﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃ ﬃ
E½Qðs;aÞ2  2 ðE½Qðs;aÞ Þ2 p ; ð21bÞ
where b0 is a new inverse-temperature meta-parameter and
is constant. E[·] denotes the expectation with respect to the
current policy and it is approximated based on actual
experiences using the current policy. Using the normalized
soft-max policy, the action randomness is normalized so
that exploratory actions do not signiﬁcantly depend on the
variation of their expected results.
The normalized soft-max policies (21a) and (21b) is
equivalent to the original soft-max policy (20) with a new
inverse-temperature:
bðsÞ¼b0·blðsÞ¼
b0 ﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃ ﬃ
E½Qðs;aÞ2  2 ðE½Qðs;aÞ Þ2 p : ð22Þ
Note that b(s) does not depend on action a. Accordingly, in
order to introduce the randomness normalized with respect
to the variation of the action-value function, the inverse-
temperature b becomes dependent on state s. bl(s) is then
called the local coefﬁcient of the inverse-temperature.
4.3. Global control of randomness
Exploration is important especially when the agent
perceives that the environment has probably changed. If
the agent believes that the environment has not changed, in
contrast, exploitation is more important than exploration.
Therefore, the inverse-temperature should be controlled
based on the perception of the environmental change.
One such control can be done by
bg U
a þð 1 2 aÞbg ðif ^ z
0 ¼ ^ zÞ
br ðotherwiseÞ
(
; ð23Þ
where ^ z ð^ z0Þ is the estimation of the unobservable variables
before the action (after the action). 0 , a , 1 is a constant
that determines how fast bg approaches its maximum value
( ¼ 1.0) from its minimum value ( ¼ br). When the
estimation of the unobservable variables does not change
after an actual experience (action), the agent guesses that the
environment represented by the unobservable variables has
not changed. The upper condition in Eq. (23) says that bg
gradually increases in such a case (see Fig. 6). The agent
then prefers exploitation. When the estimation of the
unobservable variables changes after an actual experience,
in contrast, the agent guesses that the environment has
changed. The lower condition in Eq. (23) says that bg is set
to its minimum value in such a case. The agent then prefers
exploration in order to quickly adapt to the new
environment.
If the environment is deterministic like in the maze
example, the following control will work well:
bg U
a þð 1 2 aÞbg ðif z ¼ ^ zÞ
br ðotherwiseÞ
(
: ð24Þ
When an actual perception of the unobservable variables, z,
is different from its expected one ^ z; the agent guesses that
the environment has changed. This control is not appro-
priate for stochastic environments such that the perception
of unobservable variables may differ from their expectation
due to the stochastic nature.
With either of the controls above, inverse-temperature b
in the original soft-max policy (20) is replaced by
bðsÞ¼b0·bg·blðsÞ: ð25Þ
bl(s) considers the variation of the action-value function
and locally controls the randomness, while bg attempts to
perceive the environmental change and globally controls the
randomness. Then, bg is called the global coefﬁcient of the
inverse-temperature.
In the later experiments, we use the second control
method given by Eq. (24).
4.4. Exploration bonus
In RL, the reward function is determined according to the
task that is to be accomplished by the agent. It is usually
independent of the amount of environmental information
that the agent has. For actual animals, however, information
of the environment is very important. Exploration is nothing
but acquiring information from the environment. By
assuming an additional reward term corresponding to the
information that will be acquired from the environment, the
agent is encouraged to take exploratory actions; this is
the idea of our exploration bonus.
The bonus is given in proportional to the entropy of the
posterior distribution of the state-transition, HDðs;aÞ; where
the deﬁnition of entropy HD is described in Appendix A (see
Eq. (A9)). Using the bonus, the action-value function used
in the soft-max policy (20) is modiﬁed into
r
þðs;aÞ¼rðs;aÞþeHDðs;aÞ; ð26aÞ
Q
þðs;aÞ¼r
þðs;aÞþg
X
s0
^ Pðs
0ls;aÞVðs
0Þ; ð26bÞ
where e is a constant.
A small entropy means that the information acquired
from the environment by taking action a at state s,i s
expected to be small with respect to the current estimation
of the environment; in this case, the probability to take the
action is decreased. When the acquired information is
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increased. This results in an encouragement of exploration.
The POMDP formulation provides us with another
interpretation of the exploration bonus. In a POMDP, an
action determined by the approximated Bellman’s equations
(5a) and (5b) may be different from the optimal action in the
belief state MDP. Such a situation occurs especially when
the agent is uncertain of the estimation of the unobservable
variables. As discussed in Section 3.4, the entropy of the
state transitions is similar to the entropy of the unobservable
variables. Therefore, the exploration bonus can be inter-
preted as follows. A small entropy of the state transition
means that an action determined by our model-based RL is
close to the optimal action in the belief state MDP.
Therefore, the action selection should not be disturbed by
the exploration bonus. On the other hand, a large entropy of
the state transition means that an action determined by our
model-based RL may be apart from the optimal action in the
belief state MDP. In such a case, the agent prefers acquiring
a large information so as to be certain of the environment.
Although the exploration bonus modiﬁes the policy, it
does not affect the Bellman’s equations (1a) and (1b) or (5a)
and (5b). Namely, the bonus does not introduce any bias to
the estimation of the value function.
4.5. Reinforcement learning algorithm
Here we summarize the whole RL algorithm for a single
learning episode.
1. Set the agent to a start state.
2. For a speciﬁc number of state transitions, the following
steps are conducted.
(a) Let y be the current observable state. Each
unobservable variable ^ z; which is relevant to y,
is estimated as zk ¼ 1 such that k ¼ arg maxi   gi;
where   g is given by Eq. (15).
(b) For every action a possible at y, conduct the
following steps.
(i) For every possible observable state y0 that is
reachable from y by a, the state-transition
probability ^ Pðy0ly;aÞ is calculated by Eq.
(15).
(ii) Using s ¼½ y;^ z  and ^ Pðy0ly;aÞ; obtain Qðs;aÞ
by Eq. (17).
(iii) Using s ¼½ y;^ z  and ^ Pðy0ly;aÞ; obtain
Qþðs;aÞ by Eqs. (26a) and (26b).
(c) Update V(s) based on Eq. (5a).
3
(d) Obtain b(s) by Eq. (25).
(e) Calculate PpðalsÞ according to Eq. (20) with the
replacement of Qðs;aÞ by Qþðs;aÞ and the
replacement of b by b(s).
(f) An action a is selected with probability PpðalsÞ:
Observable state y changes to a new observable
state y00 according to the real dynamics of the
environment.
(g) Update the sufﬁcient statistics corresponding to y00
by Eqs. (14a) and (14b).
(h) According to the upper rule in Eq. (16), increment
the effective data number for the state–action pair
ðs;aÞ:
(i) If y00 is a goal state, exit the loop. Otherwise, y U
y00 and go to step (a).
3. According to the lower rule in Eq. (16), decrease the
effective data number for every state–action pair.
In our RL scheme, the Boltzmann policy with a modiﬁed
inverse-temperature realizes undirected exploration, while
the exploration bonus realizes directed but local explora-
tion. It should be noted that our RL scheme does not use
imaginary value-iteration steps based on the current
environmental model,
4 although such imaginary steps
were used in DYNA system of Sutton (1990) and Dayan
and Sejnowski (1996).
5. Simulation results
Our RL scheme is applied to two-dimensional maze
tasks.
5.1. Task setting
The ﬁrst maze has a 16 £ 16 grid (Fig. 2). This task is a
modiﬁcation of the one used by Dayan and Sejnowski
(1996), which originated from Sutton (1990). At each grid
point, the agent takes one offour actions: a [ {N;S;E;W};
though an action going beyond the maze boundary is not
allowed. The maze boundary is visible. For every action, an
immediate reward 21 is given, i.e. a cost 1 is given. The
agent moves from the start point to the goal point. When the
agent arrives at the goal point, the episode ends. If the agent
cannot get to the goal point within 200 action steps, the
episode also ends. Since the objective of the agent is to
search for the optimal policy maximizing the reward
accumulation, it is required to ﬁnd out the shortest path
from the start point to the goal point.
There are bi-directional barriers in the maze. If the
agent tries to take an action going beyond a barrier, it
stays at the current grid point and receives a reward 21.
Barriers are invisible;namely, whether a barrier exists ornot
can be perceived only by executing an action. Since the
existence of barriers is deterministic but temporally variant,
it is assumed to be a stochastic event. The existence of a
barrier portion is represented by an unobservable probabil-
istic variable. The number of possible values for each
3 A gradual updating method is preferable in a stochastic environment.
4 Although imaginary steps are useful for quickly propagating a local
change of the environment to the whole state space, they need additional
computational time.
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With respect to the state transition, the number of possible
transitions for each state–action pair is also two; moving to
a new grid point by a successful action or staying at the
current grid point due to an unsuccessful action. Therefore,
the Bayes inference estimates a binomial probabilistic
model for every unobservable variable (or state–action
pair). This is the inference of the environmental model.
In order to see the agent’s ability to deal with the
exploitation–exploration problem, the environment
changes with time. In this maze task, the existence of
barriers changes. The series of learning episodes are divided
into three stages, as shown in Fig. 2. At the ﬁrst stage
(1 , 400 learning episodes), there are vertical barriers and
the shortest paths to the goal go around the northernmost
part of the barriers. The length of the shortest paths is 32.
At the second stage (401 , 800 learning episodes), the
southernmost portion of the barriers is removed. The length
of the shortest paths, which go through the removed barrier
portion, turns to be 26. At the third stage (801 , 1200
learning episodes), new barriers appear to hinder the agent
from going along the barriers. At this stage, the length of the
shortest paths does not change, while the variation of the
shortest paths becomes small; the agent needs to go
straightly south from the start point.
In our RL scheme, if a certain time period has passed
after the last perception of the barrier existence, i.e. failure
to go beyond the barrier, the agent comes to forget the
existence. Due to this effect, the estimation of the value
function is likely to involve the possibility of barrier
disappearance. At the second stage, therefore, the value
function on a grid point along the barriers is larger than that
on a grid point apart from the barriers, even if the distance
to the goal is the same. In order to ﬁnd out the shortest path
at the third stage, therefore, the agent ﬁrst needs to go
around the new barriers and to recognize that the actual
shortest path is the one that goes straightly south from the
start point. This is the difﬁculty of this maze task.
The value function V(s) is initialized to be 0.0 for every
state. Since the initial value of the value function is smaller
than its real value, possible actions are tried several times at
every state at the early learning stage. Although this
‘optimistic’ initialization is a very simple heuristic method
to encourage the exploration, it is not effective in adapting
to the environmental change.
5.2. Simulation result
Our RL scheme is applied to the maze task above. Fig.
3(a) shows the number of actions during 1200 learning
episodes. At the ﬁrst stage, the action number signiﬁcantly
varies, because the estimated value function is distant from
the real one and hence the action randomness is large.
Another reason is the effect of the optimistic initialization.
At the second and third stages, the variation of action
number becomes small because the improvement of the
value function suppresses the action randomness.
Fig. 3(a, lower) shows that the agent successfully ﬁnds
out the shortest path, whose length is 32 at the ﬁrst stage and
26 at the second and third stages. The randomness in its
actions is small so that the average number of actions is
slightly larger than the shortest path length. When the new
barriers appear at the beginning of the third stage, the
number of actions grows considerably. After a short trial-
and-error period, however, the agent successfully ﬁnds out
the new shortest path.
The role of the control of the inverse-temperature is
examined by comparing the result with that by a similar
method with a ﬁxed inverse-temperature. Fig. 3(b) and (c)
show the results with the inverse-temperature values ﬁxed at
a large value ðb ¼ 100Þ and a small value ðb ¼ 1:0Þ;
respectively. Even with a ﬁxed inverse-temperature, the
exploration bonus is used. If it is not used, the agent with a
large inverse-temperature cannot adapt to the environmental
change. With a large constant value for the inverse-
temperature, the agent prefers exploitation to exploration.
Fig. 3(b, upper) shows that the averaged action number at
the third stage is larger than that at the second stage. The
agent does not ﬁnd out the shortest path at the third stage
and it selects the semi-optimal path going around the
Fig. 2. A maze task with a 16 £ 16 grid. ‘S’ and ‘G’ denote the start point and the goal point, respectively. The thick line denotes bi-directional barriers. The
maze boundary is visible, while the barriers are invisible. The objective of the agent is to ﬁnd out the shortest path from the start point to the goal point.
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environmental change is thus small in this agent. With a
small constant value for the inverse-temperature, in
contrast, the averaged action number stays large throughout
the three stages (Fig. 3(c)).
Fig. 4 shows the average performance for the three
agents. We executed 100 training runs by varying initial
conditions and the ordinate in Fig. 4 denotes the average
number of actions over the 100 runs.
Fig. 5 shows the position distribution of the three agents.
Each sub-ﬁgure shows the logarithm of the number of visits
to each grid point. The upper three sub-ﬁgures show that the
agent with the inverse-temperature control follows the
shortest path at the three stages. Especially at the third stage,
the path variation in the western part of the barriers is small.
This part is important for following the shortest path. In
contrast, the variation in the eastern part of the barriers is
large. This part is not very important for following the
shortest path. The middle three sub-ﬁgures show that the
path variation of the agent with a large constant for the
inverse-temperature is small. This agent cannot ﬁnd out the
shortest path at the third stage. The lower three sub-ﬁgures
show that the path variation of the agent with a small
inverse-temperature is so large that at the third stage it
almost randomly selects a path going around the northern-
most part or the southernmost part of the barriers.
Fig. 6 shows the global coefﬁcient of the inverse-
temperature, bg, during a single training run. When the
agent perceives the environmental change, exploration is
encouraged in order to adapt to the new environment by
making bg a small value. When the RL agent does not
perceive the environmental change, it prefers exploitation
by increasing bg. Fig. 7 shows the reciprocal of the local
coefﬁcient of the inverse-temperature at each grid point, i.e.
1/bl(s). On the grid points except for those adjacent to the
barriers, the inverse-temperature is large so that the agent
prefers exploitation. On the grid points adjacent to the
barriers, in contrast, the inverse-temperature is small so that
Fig. 3. Number of actions taken by the three agents. (a)–(c) The abscissa denotes the number of learning episodes. The ordinate denotes the number of actions
averaged over 10 episodes in the upper ﬁgure, and the number of actions in each episode in the lower ﬁgure. The dotted (dash) line denotes the shortest path
length at stage 1 (stages 2 and 3). We conducted experiments many times by varying the random seeds, and these ﬁgures are the most typical ones among them.
(a) Learning process of an agent with the control of the inverse-temperature. Parameters are set at k ¼ 0:98; b0 ¼ 10; br ¼ 0:001; a ¼ 0:0005; and e ¼ 3: (b)
Learning process of an agent with a large constant ðb ¼ 100Þ for the inverse-temperature. (c) Learning process of an agent with a small constant ðb ¼ 1:0Þ for
the inverse-temperature.
Fig. 3 (continued)
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barriers to disappear.
In our method, the inverse-temperature control and the
exploration bonus cooperatively control the exploitation–
exploration balance. Fig. 8 shows a result for an RL agent
with the inverse-temperature control but without the
exploration bonus. Since the action randomness should be
large in order for this agent to adapt to the environmental
changes, the average steps to the goal becomes larger than
those of an agent with the exploration bonus (see Fig.
4(upper)).
5.3. Zig-zag maze
Our RL scheme is next applied to a more complicated
‘zig-zag’ maze (Fig. 9). This task is also a modiﬁcation of
the one used by Dayan and Sejnowski (1996).A tt h eﬁ r s t
stage (1 , 500 learning episodes), the shortest path to the
goal is a zig-zag one and its length is 41. At the second
stage (501 , 1000 learning episodes), a barrier portion is
removed so that the shortest path becomes the straight one
whose length is 21. At the third stage (1000 , 1500
learning episodes), the barrier portion appears again but
Fig. 4. Number of actions taken by the three agents. We executed 100 trainingruns by varyinginitial conditions and the ordinate denotes the average number of
actions over the 100 runs. (upper) Learning process of an agent with the control of the inverse-temperature. (middle) Learning process of an agent with a large
inverse-temperature. (lower) Learning process of an agent with a small inverse-temperature.
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passes the easternmost part of the maze and its length is
31.
Fig. 10 shows results by the three learning agents: (a)
with the control of the inverse-temperature; (b) with a large
constant ðb ¼ 100Þ for the inverse-temperature; and (c) with
a small constant ðb ¼ 0:85Þ for the inverse-temperature.
The agent with the control successfully adapts to the
environmental changes, while the agent with a large
constant cannot adapt to the second change of the
environment.
Accordingly, setting the inverse-temperature at a large
value corresponds to respecting exploitation, while
setting it at a small value corresponds to respecting
exploration. With a ﬁxed value, the agent cannot change
the balance between them, although the balance control
is important especially when the environment changes
with time.
6. Exploitation–exploration problem in the brain
6.1. Selective attention
Attention is a cognitive function, whose aim is to focus
the consciousness on one of the targets of sensation,
perception or thought. Attention can be divided into two
operations: one is selective attention and the other is
sustained attention. They can be validated by different
psychological tasks. In a selective attention task, on one
hand, a subject is required to process one of the two or more
stimuli provided simultaneously. In a sustained attention
task, on the other hand, a subject is required to focus on a
speciﬁc stimulus for a certain period. Selective attention is
important for selecting information in order to achieve an
objective, whereas sustained attention is important for
maintaining the objective itself.
This section discusses selective attention. Awake human
Fig. 5. Logarithm of the number of visits to each grid point for the three agents. The lighter a grid point is, the more frequently the agent visits the grid point. In
order to see the behavior of the agents after adapting to the current environment, each sub-ﬁgure shows the average in the last 100 learning episodes at each of
the three stages. (upper) An agent with the control of the inverse-temperature. (middle) An agent with a large inverse-temperature. (lower) An agent with a
small inverse-temperature.
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memories, emotions and innumerable sensory inputs via
various modality channels. Selective attention processes
only appropriate portion among vast amount of information,
and is a necessary ability in order to rapidly execute
appropriate behaviors in a real environment.
Attention is believed to have three major functions:
orientation to stimuli, executive function and maintenance
of an alert state (Posner & Raichle, 1996). The orientation to
stimuli is to orient a part of a body to the direction of a novel
stimulus. The executive function is related to control of
goal-directed behaviors, detection of targets, resolution of
conﬂicts, suppression of unconscious reaction, and so on.
The executive function is necessary in a novel or highly
competitive situation, and is important especially in a
selective attention task. The maintenance of an alert state
involves the establishment of a vigilant state and the
readiness for a rapid reaction. This function is necessary not
only in a sustained attention task, but also for sustaining the
objective in a selective attention task.
6.2. Locus coeruleus and inverse-temperature
Tonic activities of noradrenergic LC neurons depend on
sleep-awake stages; namely, they are active in an awake
state, less active in a slow-wave sleep state and nearly silent
in a rapid-eye-movement sleep state (Aston-Jones, Chiang,
& Alexinsky, 1991). Therefore, LC neurons have long been
thought to regulate arousality of the brain. However, a
recent study based on multicellular recordings of LC
neurons in monkeys performing a visual discrimination
task has suggested that the LC neurons also have relevance
to selective attention (Aston-Jones, Rajkowski, Kubiak, &
Alexinsky, 1994). Since the response latency of the LC
neurons correlates with the behavioral response time, it is
suggested that the LC activity induced by the target
facilitates the behavioral response to the target.
The LC, which is located by the forth ventricle in the
mid-pontine region of the brain stem, is the major
noradrenergic nucleus in the brain. LC neurons have
widespread projection on the telencephalic cortical structures
Fig.7. Reciprocalof localcoefﬁcient oftheinverse-temperatureat eachgridpoint,1/bl(s),foran agentwiththecontrolofthe inverse-temperature;the lightera
grid point is, the higher the temperature is.
Fig. 6. Global coefﬁcient of the inverse-temperature, bg, during a single training run. After 400 and 800 episodes, the environment changes.
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1983).
Spontaneous activities of LC neurons play a role in the
maintenance of the arousal state. Since the brain areas
associated with attentional processing exhibit particularly
dense LC innervations (Morrison & Foote, 1986), the LC is
probably related to selective attention by controlling the
signal-to-noise ratio of the brain processing. In a compu-
tational model by Servan-Schreiber, Printz, and Cohen
(1990) and Usher et al. (1999), noradrenaline sharpens the
response tuning of neurons by increasing the gain of the
sigmoidal transfer function.
A recent study on LC neuron recordings showed that
spontaneous and stimulus-induced discharge patterns are
correlated with behavioral performance (Usher et al., 1999).
Phasic LC discharges, which selectively respond to target
stimuli, are associated with good behavioral performance.
Good performance will be achieved by focusing the
consciousness on the target stimuli. On the other hand, a
higher level of tonic LC discharges is associated with a
higher false alarm error rate, implying a low attentional
level.
Usher et al. (1999) suggested that the phasic and the tonic
discharges seem to correspond to the exploitation operation
and the exploration operation, respectively. Their model
assumed that the two modes in LC neuron discharges are
controlled by the strength of electrotonic couplings among
the LC neurons; namely, the strong and weak couplings
induce phasic and tonic ﬁrings, respectively. Therefore, the
coupling strength controls the balance between exploitation
and exploration. The existence of electrotonic couplings in
the LC has been suggested in adult rats (Ishimaru &
Williams, 1996) and the couplings are considered to
regulate activities of LC neurons (Christie, Williams, &
North, 1989).
The idea by Usher et al. is similar to that of our model in
which the exploitation–exploration balance is controlled by
a single parameter, i.e. the inverse-temperature meta-
parameter b. Actually, the sigmoidal transfer function
(Servan-Schreiber et al., 1990) of behavioral neurons in the
Usher’s model is similar to the soft-max policy in our
model, when the number of possible actions is two as in the
visual discrimination task used in Usher et al. (lever release
and hold).
Fig. 9. A ‘zig-zag’ maze task. ‘S’ and ‘G’ denote the start point and the goal point, respectively. The thick line denotes bi-directional barriers. The objective of
the agent is to ﬁnd out the shortest path from the start point to the goal point.
Fig. 8. Number of actions taken by an agent with the control of the inverse-temperature but without the exploration bonus. We executed 100 training runsb y
varying initial conditions and the ordinate denotes the average number of actions over the 100 runs. Parameters are set at k ¼ 0:98; b0 ¼ 1:6; br ¼ 0:001; and
a ¼ 0:0005: In order to make the agent adapt to the environmental changes, b0 is set at a smaller value than in the simulation in Fig. 4.
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temperature is implemented as an activity pattern of LC
neurons.
6.3. Calculation of inverse-temperature
Since projection from anterior cingulate cortex (ACC), in
particular, Brodmann’s area 24 and the rostral part of area
32, to the LC has recently been found (Rajkowski, Lu, Zhu,
Cohen, & Aston-Jones, 2000), it is considered that the ACC
regulates the activities of LC neurons, possibly by
controlling the couplings among them.
The ACC (areas 24 and 32) is located on the medial
surface of the frontal lobe and superior to the corpus
callosum. Since the ACC is activated especially when the
action selection requires a ‘top-down’ supervisory system,
the ACC has been linked to the executive function of
attention (Vogt, Finch, & Olson, 1992). Since the ACC is
not activated in a vigilance task, which is used to validate
sustained attention, the ACC is mainly involved in selective
attention. A neuroanatomical study suggested that the ACC
can be divided into different functional subregions (Picard
& Strick, 1996), implying that the ACC has multiple
functions (Bush et al., 2002). We assume here that both the
local and the global coefﬁcients of the inverse-temperature
are calculated and represented in the ACC.
A recent study on single-cell recordings from monkeys
performing a reward-based decision-making task reported
that cingulate motor area (CMA)
5 has relevance to reward-
based behaviors (Shima & Tanji, 1998). A monkey
continued a particular behavior during constant-reward
trials, while the reward decrement led to an active switching
of the behavioral rule. It was found that neurons in the
rostral CMA were saliently activated when a monkey
switched the behavioral rule. Furthermore, the blocking of
this area by muscimol injection induced a failure of smooth
switching or a needless switching. These results suggest that
the CMA plays an important role in behavior selection by
detecting the distinction between an expected reward and an
actual reward. A recent human neuroimaging study using a
similar task also observed ACC activation (Bush et al.,
2002). According to electrophysiological studies measuring
error-related negativity (ERN; Gehring, Goss, Coles,
Fig. 10. Number of actions taken by the three agents. (a)–(c) The abscissa denotes the number of learning episodes. The ordinate denotes the number of actions
averaged over 10 episodes in the upper ﬁgure, and the number of actions in each episode in the lower ﬁgure. The dotted, dash and dash-dotted lines denote the
shortest path lengths at stages 1, 2 and 3, respectively. (a) Learning process of an agent with the control of the inverse-temperature. Parameters are set at
k ¼ 0:995; b0 ¼ 10; br ¼ 0:0003; a ¼ 0:0003; and e ¼ 8: (b) Learning process of an agent with a large constant ðb ¼ 100Þ for the inverse-temperature. (c)
Learning process of an agent with a small constant ðb ¼ 0:85Þ for the inverse-temperature.
5 The CMA of primates resides in the banks of the cingulate sulcus in the
medial surface ofthe cerebral hemisphereand overlapsthe ACCin humans.
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monitoring of errors. The ERN is a large negative polarity
peak in an event-related potential waveform that occurs
when a subject makes an error in a reaction time task. A
recent imaging study also found that a rostral inferior ACC
region is mainly related to the error detection (Braver,
Barch, Gray, Molfese, & Snyder, 2001). These studies
suggest that the ACC detects the environmental change
using the result of own response, i.e. error or error
prediction, so that changes in behavioral rules are induced.
This control of the behavior selection is consistent with our
control method of the global coefﬁcient of the inverse-
temperature.
On the other hand, several neuroimaging studies
suggested that error-related ACC activities are likely
due to detection of a conﬂict among incompatible
responses (Botvinick, Nystrom, Fissell, Carter, &
Cohen, 1999; Carter et al., 1998). This is called the
conﬂict monitoring theory. While performing a visual
discrimination task, i.e. a variation of continuous
performance tests or a ﬂanker task, the ACC exhibited
transient activity increase during incorrect responses.
However, greater ACC activity was also observed
during correct responses in a situation with a high
level of conﬂict. The ACC was also activated signiﬁ-
cantly in a novel environment. According to a positron
emission tomography (PET) study on motor sequence
learning, the ACC was activated during a learning of
new sequences but not during an automatic execution
after the learning (Jenkins, Brooks, Nixon, Frackowiak,
& Passingham, 1994). A later study indicated that the
ACC was activated more when a subject learned a new
sequence than when the subject simply paid attention
to a prelearned sequence (Jueptner et al., 1997). Thus,
the ACC activities depend on the state of the subject.
They are linked to the variation of possible results, i.e.
the response conﬂict, and are related to reward-based
learning processes especially in an unfamiliar
environment.
In our RL scheme, the randomness due to the control of
the local coefﬁcient bl(s) is dependent on the agent’s state,
and it is large when the variation of the action-value
function with respect to the current policy is large. The large
variation of the action-value function is mainly due to the
large variation of the policy, implying that the current state
is unfamiliar or conﬂicting. Accordingly, the above-
mentioned activities of the ACC seem to be consistent
with our control method for the local coefﬁcient of the
inverse-temperature.
Based on the conﬂict monitoring theory, Cohen,
Botvinick, and Carter (2000) presented a mechanism on
how the ACC controls cognitive functions. If competing
responses are simultaneously represented in the prefrontal
cortex (PFC), the ACC detects a conﬂict. Subsequently, the
LC system responds to the conﬂict detected by the ACC,
and competitively suppresses the irrelevant representation
activated by a distractor. The response conﬂict is thus
reduced. Namely, this mechanism increases the level of
selective attention when the ACC detects a conﬂict.
However, the model by Cohen et al. focused on an
exploitation operation and did not consider an active
exploration operation, because they assumed a static
environment, i.e. the task does not change.
Our study assumes dynamic environments, where a
conﬂict occurs due not only to the forgetting of the
environment but also to the environmental change.
Similarly to the model by Cohen et al., in our method,
the level of selective attention is controlled based on the
conﬂict detection. However, the control depends on
expectation of resultant value, i.e. prediction of
consequence, of the conﬂict. If the resultant value will
vary so much, the level of attention is rather decreased
so that active exploratory behaviors are encouraged. As
discussed earlier, the ACC is related to an active change
of policy (Shima & Tanji, 1998), and we suggest that
the system incorporating the ACC and the LC is related
to inducing active exploratory behaviors.
6.4. Evaluation of environment
If the ACC evaluates the variation of the current action-
value function, it should be provided with the evaluation of
the environment. The ACC mainly receives innervations
from the frontal association cortex (or PFC). It is known that
connections of the cingulate cortices with other fronto-
cortical areas are not limited to immediate neighbors, but
also more distant prefrontal regions, particularly those in
dorsolateral PFC (Barbas & Pandya, 1989).
The PFC receives sensory inputs processed by other
association cortices, whereas the other association
cortices directly receive sensory inputs. The major
areas to which the PFC outputs are motor systems such
as the striatum and the motor association cortex. The
PFC is considered to direct various higher-order func-
tions, e.g. decision-making, behavioral inhibition, plan-
ning of behavior, action evaluation, and maintenance of
working memories. Since the PFC function cannot be
explained by a unitary theory, the PFC should be divided
into several functionally different subregions. Here, we
introduce three important subregions: dorsolateral pre-
frontal cortex (DLPF, areas 9 and 46), orbitofrontal
cortex (OFC, area 47/12) and anterior prefrontal cortex
(APF, area 10). We speculate that the functions used in
RL are expressed, maintained and learned within these
brain regions.
6.4.1. DLPF/OFC and value function
Studies on the DLPF have been mainly focused on a
working memory function, i.e. the active maintenance
of necessary information for a certain period of time.
Rao, Rainer, and Miller (1997) recorded activities of
DLPF neurons from monkeys performing a visually
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presented at the center of gaze. After a delay (the
what delay), the sample object and a distractor were
simultaneously presented at two different locations
among four possible locations. After another delay
(the where delay), the monkey was required to make a
saccade to the remembered location where the sample
had appeared. During this task, DLPF neurons showed
sustained activities like the working memory during the
what and/or where delay. In the what delay, on one
hand, the monkey should keep a partial information to
achieve its behavior. In the where delay, on the other
hand, the monkey should keep the action to do. Thus,
DLPF neurons exhibit state-dependent and action-
dependent sustained activities (Hoshi, Shima, & Tanji,
2000).
Recent recording studies have revealed that DLPF
neurons predict the quality and the quantity of the future
reward (Leon & Shadlen, 1999; Watanabe, 1996). DLPF
neurons of monkeys performing a delayed response task
exhibited large activity when a preferred reward was
expected, while the activity was small when a non-preferred
reward was expected (Watanabe, 1996). Among such
reward-dependent neurons, some were independent of the
action to be selected, but the others were dependent on the
action, i.e. which button to press (Watanabe, 1996). A later
study using monkeys performing a memory-guided eye
movement task showed that DLPF neurons exhibited larger
activities when the monkey expected a larger reward (Leon
& Shadlen, 1999). In this experiment, the monkey was
informed in advance the amount of reward received by a
successful completion of the task. The expected quantity of
the reward also affected the success rate and the reaction
time.
These experimental results imply that DLPF neurons are
activated depending on state and/or action, and the activities
represent the estimation of accumulated reward (total future
reward), i.e. the value function or the action-value function
in RL.
According to a recent view, the DLPF constructs
automata, i.e. cascade networks representing transitions of
states, in order to successively achieve a behavioral goal
(Tanji & Hoshi, 2001). A physiological recording study
using monkeys performing a delayed motor task investi-
gated movement-related neuronal activities in the DLPF
(Hoshi et al., 2000). The ﬁndings of neurons that were
selectively active in different task phases showed that
integration of movement information and behavioral
planning are executed within an automaton in the DLPF.
Since behavioral planning requires an environmental model,
we assume that environmental models are, at least partly,
expressed in the DLPF.
The OFC has dense connections with basolateral
amygdala (ABL) and ventral tagmental area (VTA) which
are involved in emotion and motivation functions. It is
considered that the OFC is crucially involved in the
motivational control of goal-directed behaviors (Rolls,
1996). For example, monkeys with an OFC damage showed
performance impairment in an object-reversal task; the
monkeys continued to respond to an object which was no
longer rewarded (Meunier, Bachevalier, & Mishkin, 1997).
A lesion study with humans also showed similar results
(Rolls, Hornak, Wade, & McGrath, 1994). In addition, the
OFC seems to have a role in monitoring rewards in order to
select appropriate actions (Elliott, Dolan, & Frith, 2000).
According to a study on neural activities of rats in an
olfactory discrimination task, OFC neurons were activated
selectively during the anticipation of rewarding or aversive
outcomes (Schoenbaum, Chiba, & Gallagher, 1998).
Furthermore, a functional magnetic resonance imaging
(f-MRI) study using an emotion-related visual reversal-
learning task found that the activation magnitude of the
OFC was correlated with the magnitude of received rewards
(O’Doherty, Kringelbach, Rolls, Hornak, & Andrews,
2001). These evidences suggest that the OFC is related to
rapid stimulus–reward association learning, and we assume
that the OFC maintains the evaluation of immediate or
short-term accumulated rewards in order to execute a long-
term planning.
6.4.2. APF and state estimation
Many PFC studies have concentrated on the posterior
regions including the DLPF and the OFC, and there has
been far less consideration to the APF. Using a branching
task, in which the maintenance of a primary task was
necessary while performing a subtask, Koechlin, Corrado,
Pietrini, and Grafman (2000) showed that the APF was
activated when a subject could not predict whether the
forthcoming task would be the primary task or the subtask.
Another imaging study using an explicit categorization task
suggested that a rule change evoked an activation in the
APF (Strange, Henson, Friston, & Dolan, 2001). These
results enable us to make a speculation that the APF is
involved in the prediction of a (signiﬁcant) change of the
environment. We assume that the estimation of unobserv-
able states (environment) is related to the function of the
APF.
Accordingly, we assume that the reward-based environ-
mental model, i.e. the value function, the action-value
function and the environmental model with the estimation
of unobservable states, used in RL, are maintained in the
PFC.
6.5. Dopaminergic system and novelty bonus
An animal placed in a novel environment is likely to
display exploratory behaviors in order to analyze the new
situation. Exploration of novel stimuli can be rewarding,
and we have introduced in this study an exploration bonus
added to the immediate reward.
Dopaminergic (DA) neurons of the VTA and substantia
nigra have long been engaged on the processing of reward
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DA neurons in the VTA were activated by stimuli
associated with reward prediction and it was suggested
that the neurons represent error in the prediction of future
reward (Schultz et al., 1997). Since DA neurons were also
activated when provided novel and salient stimuli (Schultz,
1998), signals transferred by DA neurons may be modiﬁed
by the novelty bonus information.
DA neurons receive massive inputs from amygdala
(Gonzales & Chesselet, 1990) that responds to primary
rewards and reward-predicting stimuli. In addition, the
amygdala responds to relatively novel stimuli (Wilson &
Rolls, 1993) like the VTA. The amygdala is directly
interconnected with the hippocampus that is involved in
memory functions. Recent neuroimaging studies have
shown that the hippocampal region is also critically
involved in novelty detection (Stern et al., 1996; Tulving,
Markowitsch, Craik, Habib, & Houle, 1996), and the
memory system may provide the rewarding system with
the information whether the current stimulus is novel or
not. Therefore, it can be considered that novelty is
a d d e dt ot h ep r i m a r yr e w a r di n f o r m a t i o nr e p r e s e n t e di n
the amygdala.
Neurons in the ABL and the VTA directly project to
nucleus accumbens (NAc) in the ventral striatum. The NAc
may control motor systems via the ventral pallidum, and it is
considered that this is a route through which limbic
information is transferred to output systems (Pennartz,
Groenewegen, & Lopez de Silva, 1994). By stimulating the
ABL, animals tend to explore novel objects or situations. In
addition, a local infusion into the NAc of drugs that release
DA increased the magnitude of conditioned reinforcement
in an operant task (Taylor & Robbins, 1986). DA
innervations of the NAc is considered necessary for
exploratory behaviors (Yim & Mogenson, 1989).
Thus, we currently assume that the amygdala associates
the stimuli and its biological value including the novelty, i.e.
the state and its value function (action-value function)
modiﬁed by the exploration bonus, and that the system
incorporating the ABL, the VTA and the NAc is related to
producing exploratory behaviors. However, this assumption
would need further discussion in the future.
7. Conclusion
This paper presented a new RL method in which the
balance between exploitation and exploration is con-
trolled. Our RL method is a model-based one in which the
environment is estimated based on a Bayes inference. In
the estimation, the forgetting of the environment
encourages exploration. The exploitation–exploration
balance is controlled by the inverse-temperature meta-
parameter. The control is dependent on the agent’s state;
the dependence is due to the variation of the action-value
function. The control is also dependent on the perception
of the environmental changes. This method is one of the
undirected exploration methods. The exploration bonus is
also used as a directed exploration method. Our RL
method is suitable especially when the environment is
partially observable and dynamic. When applied to maze
tasks, our method exhibited good adaptability to the
environmental changes.
We also discussed a possible implementation in the
brain. According to our assumption, the inverse-
temperature is represented as the activity of the LC
neurons, and the activity is controlled by the ACC. In
order to achieve the control, the PFC maintains and
provides the ACC with the value function, the action-
value function and the environmental model. Accord-
ingly, we consider that the control of randomness in RL
is realized in the PFC–ACC–LC system and that it is
related to selective attention.
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Appendix A
This Appendix section describes a detail of the Bayes
inference method we use.
A Bayes inference considers the posterior distribution of
the parameter. The Bayes theorem states that the posterior
distribution is given by
PðglZÞ¼
PðZlgÞPðgÞ
PðZÞ
; ðA1Þ
where P(g) is a prior distribution. PðZÞ ;
Ð
PðZlgÞPðgÞdg is
the normalization factor, which is called the marginal
likelihood.
We prepare a trial posterior Q(g) in order to approximate
the posterior PðglZÞ: Q(g) is determined based on the
minimization of the following KL divergence between Q(g)
and the true posterior PðglZÞ:
KLðQlPÞ ;
ð
QðgÞlog
QðgÞ
PðglZÞ
dg
¼ log PðZÞ 2
ð
QðgÞlog
PðZlgÞPðgÞ
QðgÞ
dg
; log PðZÞ 2 FðQÞ: ðA2Þ
F(Q) is called the variational free energy. Since P(Z)
does not depend on Q(g), the minimization of the KL
divergence is equivalent to the maximization of the
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achieved by taking the variational condition: dF=dQ ¼ 0:
From the condition, the posterior distribution is analyti-
cally obtained as
log QðgÞ¼log PðZlgÞþlog PðgÞþconst:; ðA3Þ
where the constant term is determined by the distribution
condition
Ð
QðgÞdg ¼ 1:
If we assume a natural conjugate posterior distribution
for parameter g, the posterior distribution becomes a
Dirichlet distribution:
QðglnÞ¼
Gðn1 þ ···þ nM þ MÞ
Gðn1 þ 1Þ···GðnM þ 1Þ
g
n1
1 ···g
nM
M
; exp
X M
j¼1
nj log gj 2 FðnÞ
0
@
1
A; ðA4Þ
where n is a hyperparameter.
FðnÞ ;
X M
j¼1
log Gðnj þ 1Þ 2 log G
X M
k¼1
nk þ M
 !
; ðA5Þ
is the normalization term. Gð·Þ is a Gamma function.
If no a priori knowledge on the prior distribution P(g)i s
available, it is natural to choose a non-informative prior. In
the multinomial model, a non-informative prior corresponds
to regarding the log P(g) term in Eq. (A3) as constant.
Therefore, Eq. (A3) becomes
X M
j¼1
nj log gj 2 FðnÞ¼T
X M
j¼1
kzjlDlog gj þ const:; ðA6Þ
implying that
nj ¼ TkzjlD; ðA7Þ
which is the exact Bayes solution for the multinomial
model.
The entropy of the posterior distribution is obtained as
follows. First we calculate
ED½log gj  ;
ð
QðglnÞlog gj dg ¼
›FðnÞ
›nj
¼ cðnj þ 1Þ 2 c
X M
k¼1
nk þ M
 !
; ðA8Þ
where cðxÞ ; d log GðxÞ=dx is called the digamma function.
Using Eq. (A8), the entropy of the Dirichlet posterior
distribution QðglnÞ is given by
HD ; 2
ð
QðglnÞlog QðglnÞdg ¼ 2
X M
j¼1
njED½log gj þFðnÞ
¼ 2
X M
j¼1
njcðnj þ 1Þþc
X M
k¼1
nk þ M
 !
X M
j¼1
nj þ FðnÞ:
ðA9Þ
References
Aston-Jones, G., Chiang, C., & Alexinsky, T. (1991). Discharge of
noradrenergic locus coeruleus neurons in behaving rats and monkeys
suggests a role in vigilance. Progress in Brain Research, 88, 501–520.
Aston-Jones, G., Rajkowski, J., Kubiak, P., & Alexinsky, T. (1994). Locus
coeruleus neurons in monkey are selectively activated by attended cues
in a vigilance task. The Journal of Neuroscience, 14, 4467–4480.
Barbas, H., & Pandya, D. N. (1989). Architecture and intrinsic connections
of the pre-frontal cortex in the rhesus monkey. The Journal of
Comparative Neurology, 286, 353–375.
Barto, A. G., Sutton, R. S., & Anderson, C. W. (1983). Neuronlike elements
that can solve difﬁcult learning control problems. IEEE Transactions on
Systems, Man, and Cybernetics, 13, 835–846.
Botvinick, M., Nystrom, L. E., Fissell, K., Carter, C. S., & Cohen, J. D.
(1999). Conﬂict monitoring versus selection-for-action in anterior
cingulate cortex. Nature, 402, 179–181.
Brafman, R.I., & Tennenholtz, M (2001). R-max: A general polynomial
time algorithm for near-optimal reinforcement learning. Proceedings of
the 17th International Joint Conference on Artiﬁcial Intelligence (pp.
953–958).
Braver, T. S., Barch, D. M., Gray, J. R., Molfese, D. J., & Snyder, A.
(2001). Anterior cingulate cortex and response conﬂict: Effects of
frequency, inhibition and errors. Cerebral Cortex, 11, 825–836.
Bush, G., Vogt, B. A., Holmes, J., Dale, A. M., Greve, D., Jenike, M. A., &
Rosen, B. R. (2002). Dorsal anterior cingulate cortex: A role in reward-
based decision making. Proceedings of the National Academy of
Sciences, USA, 99, 507–512.
Carter, C. S., Braver, T. S., Barch, D. M., Botvinick, M. M., Noll, D., &
Cohen, J. D. (1998). Anterior cingulate cortex, error detection, and the
online monitoring of performance. Science, 280, 747–749.
Christie, M. J., Williams, J. T., & North, R. A. (1989). Electrical coupling
synchronizes subthreshold activity in locus coeruleus neurons in vitro
from neonatal rat. The Journal of Neuroscience, 9, 3584–3589.
Cohen, J. D., Botvinick, M., & Carter, C. S. (2000). Anterior cingulate and
prefrontal cortex: Who’s in control? Nature Neuroscience, 3, 421–423.
Dayan, P., & Sejnowski, T. J. (1996). Exploration bonusesand dual control.
Machine Learning, 25, 5–22.
Dearden, R., Friedman, N., & Andre, D. (1999). Model based Bayesian
exploration. Proceedings of the 15th Conference on Uncertainty in
Artiﬁcial Intelligence, San Francisco, CA: Morgan Kaufman, pp. 150–
159.
Doya, K. (2000a). Reinforcement learning in continuous time and space.
Neural Computation, 12, 219–245.
Doya, K. (2000b). Metalearning, neuromodulation, and emotion. In G.
Hatano, N. Okada, & H. Takabe (Eds.), Affective minds (pp. 101–104).
Amsterdam: Elsevier.
Elliott, R., Dolan, R. J., & Frith, C. D. (2000). Dissociable functions in the
medial and lateral orbitofrontal cortex: Evidence from human
neuroimaging studies. Cerebral Cortex, 10, 308–317.
Fe’ldbaum, A. A. (1965). Optimal control systems. New York, NY:
Academic Press.
S. Ishii et al. / Neural Networks 15 (2002) 665–687 685Foote, S. L., Bloom, F. E., & Aston-Jones, G. (1983). Nucleus locus
coeruleus: New evidence of anatomical and physiological speciﬁcity.
Physiological Reviews, 63, 844–914.
Gehring, W. J., Goss, B., Coles, M. G. H., Meyer, D. E., & Donchin, E.
(1993). A neural system for error detection and compensation.
Psychological Science, 4, 385–390.
Gonzales, C., & Chesselet, M.-F. (1990). Amygdalonigral pathway: An
anterograde study in the rat with Phaseolus vulgaris leucoagglutinin
(PHA-L). The Journal of Comparative Neurology, 297, 182–200.
Heckerman, D. (1999). A tutorial on learning with Bayesian networks. In
M. I. Jordan (Ed.), Learning in graphical models (pp. 301–354).
Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.
Hoshi, E., Shima, K., & Tanji, J. (2000). Neuronal activity in the primate
prefrontal cortex in the process of motor selection based on two
behavioral rules. Journal of Neurophysiology, 83, 2355–2373.
Ishimaru, M., & Williams, J. T. (1996). Synchronous activity in locus
coeruleus results from dendritic interactions in pericoerulear regions.
The Journal of Neuroscience, 16, 5196–5204.
Jenkins, I. H., Brooks, D. J., Nixon, P. D., Frackowiak, R. S. J., &
Passingham, R. E. (1994). Motor sequence learning: A study with
positron emission tomography. The Journal of Neuroscience, 14,
3775–3790.
Jueptner, M., Stephan, K. M., Frith, C. D., Brooks, D. J., Frackowiak, R. S.,
& Passingham, R. E. (1997). Anatomy of motor learning. I. Frontal
cortex and attention to action. The Journal of Neurophysiology, 77,
1313–1324.
Kaelbling,L. (1993).Learningin embedded systems. Cambridge,MA: MIT
Press.
Kaelbling, L. P., Littman, M. L., & Cassandra, A. R. (1998). Planning and
acting in partially observable stochasticdomains. ArtiﬁcialIntelligence,
101, 99–134.
Kearns, M., & Singh, S. (1998). Near-optimal performance for reinforce-
ment learning in polynomial time. Proceedings of the 15th International
Conference on Machine Learning, San Mateo, CA: Morgan Kaufmann,
pp. 260–268.
Koechlin, E., Corrado, G., Pietrini, P., & Grafman, J. (2000). Dissociating
the role of the medial and lateral anterior prefrontal cortex in human
planning. Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences, USA, 97,
7651–7656.
Leon, M. I., & Shadlen, M. N. (1999). Effect of expected reward magnitude
on the response of neurons in the dorsolateral prefrontal cortex of the
macaque. Neuron, 24, 415–425.
Matsuno, Y., Yamazaki, T., Matsuda, J., & Ishii, S. (2001). A multi-agent
reinforcement learning method for a partially-observable competitive
game. Proceedings of the Fifth International Conference on Autono-
mous Agents, New York, NY: ACM, pp. 39–40.
Meunier, M., Bachevalier, J., & Mishkin, M. (1997). Effects of orbital
frontal and anterior cingulate lesions on object and spatial memory in
rhesus monkeys. Neuropsychologia, 35, 999–1015.
Moore, A. W., & Atkeson, C. G. (1993). Prioritized sweeping:
Reinforcement learning with less data and less real time. Machine
Learning, 13, 103–130.
Morrison, J., & Foote, S. (1986). Noradrenergic and serotonergic
innervation of cortical, thalamic and tectal visual structures in old
and new world monkeys. The Journal of Comparative Neurology, 243,
117–128.
O’Doherty, J., Kringelbach, M. L., Rolls, E. T., Hornak, J., & Andrews, C.
(2001). Abstract reward and punishment representations in the human
orbitofrontal cortex. Nature Neuroscience, 4, 95–102.
Pennartz, C. M., Groenewegen, H. J., & Lopez de Silva, F. H. (1994). The
nucleus accumbens as a complex of functionally distinct neuronal
ensembles: An integration of behavioural, electrophysiological and
anatomical data. Progress in Neurobiology, 42, 719–761.
Picard, N., & Strick, P. L. (1996). Motor areas of the medial wall: A review
of their location and functional activation. Cerebral Cortex, 6,
342–353.
Posner, M. I., & Raichle, M. (1996). Images of mind. Washington, DC:
Scientiﬁc American Books, revised.
Rajkowski, J., Lu, W., Zhu, Y., Cohen, J., & Aston-Jones, G. (2000).
Prominent projections from the anterior cingulate cortex to the locus
coeruleus in rhesus monkey. Society of Neuroscience Abstract, 26,
2230.
Rao, S. C., Rainer, G., & Miller, E. K. (1997). Integration of what and
where in the primate prefrontal cortex. Science, 276, 821–824.
Rolls, E. T. (1996). The orbitofrontal cortex. Philosophical Transactions of
the Royal Society of London. Series B: Biological sciences, 351,
1433–1443.
Rolls, E. T., Hornak, J., Wade, D., & McGrath, J. (1994). Emotion-related
learning in patients with social and emotional changes associated with
frontal lobe damage. Journal of Neurology, Neurosurgery, and
Psychiatry, 57, 1518–1524.
Sato, M. (2001). On-line model selection based on the variational Bayes.
Neural Computation, 13, 1649–1681.
Schoenbaum, G., Chiba, A. A., & Gallagher, M. (1998). Orbitofrontal
cortex and basolateral amygdala encode expected outcomes during
learning. Nature Neuroscience, 1, 155–159.
Schultz, W. (1998). Predictive reward signal of dopamine neurons. The
Journal of Neurophysiology, 80, 1–27.
Schultz, W., Dayan, P., & Montague, R. P. (1997). A neural substrate of
prediction and reward. Science, 275, 1593–1599.
Servan-Schreiber, D., Printz, H., & Cohen, J. D. (1990). A network model if
catecholamine effects: Gain, signal-to-noise ratio, and behavior.
Science, 249, 892–895.
Shima,K.,& Tanji,J.(1998).Rolefor cingulatemotorareacellsinvoluntary
movement selection based on reward. Science, 282,1335–1338.
Singh, S. P., Jaakkola, T., & Jordan, M. I. (1994). Learning without state-
estimation in partially observable Markovian decision processes.
Proceedings of the 11th International Conference on Machine
Learning, San Francisco, CA: Morgan Kaufmann, pp. 284–292.
Stern, C. E., Corkin, S., Gonzalez, R. G., Guimaraes, A. R., Baker, J. R.,
Jennings,P.J.,Carr,C.A.,Sugiura,R.M.,Vedantham,V.,&Rosen,B.R.
(1996).Thehippocampalformationparticipatesinnovelpictureencoding:
Evidence from functional magnetic resonance imaging. Proceedings of
the National Academy of Sciences, USA, 93, 8660–8665.
Strange, B. A., Henson, R. N. A., Friston, K. J., & Dolan, R. J. (2001).
Anterior prefrontal cortex mediates rule learning in humans. Cerebral
Cortex, 11, 1040–1046.
Sutton, R. S. (1988). Learning to predict by the methods of temporal
differences. Machine Learning, 3, 9–44.
Sutton, R.S (1990). Integrated architectures for learning, planning, and
reacting based on approximating dynamic programming. Machine
Learning: Proceeding of the Seventh International Conference (pp.
216–224).
Sutton, R. S., & Barto, A. G. (1998). Reinforcement learning: An
introduction. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.
Tanji, J., & Hoshi, E. (2001). Behavioral planning in the prefrontal cortex.
Current Opinion in Neurobiology, 11, 164–170.
Taylor, J. R., & Robbins, T. W. (1986). 6-Hydroxydopamine lesions of the
nucleus accumbens, but not of the caudate nucleus, attenuate enhanced
responding with reward-related stimuli produced by intra-accumbens d-
amphetamine. Psychopharmacology, 90, 390–397.
Thrun, S. B. (1992). The role of exploration in learning control. Handbook
of intelligent control: Neural, fuzzy and adaptive approaches, Frorence,
KY: Van Nostrand Reinhold.
Tulving, E., Markowitsch,H. J., Craik, F. E., Habib,R., & Houle, S. (1996).
Novelty and familiarity activations in PET studies of memory encoding
and retrieval. Cerebral Cortex, 6, 71–79.
Usher, M., Cohen, J. D., Servan-Schreiber, D., Rajkowski, J., & Aston-
Jones, G. (1999). The role of locus coeruleus in the regulation of
cognitive performance. Science, 283, 549–554.
Vogt, B. A., Finch, D. M., & Olson, C. R. (1992). Functional heterogeneity
in cingulate cortex: The anterior executive and posterior evaluative
regions. Cerebral Cortex, 2, 435–443.
S. Ishii et al. / Neural Networks 15 (2002) 665–687 686Waelti, P., Dickinson, A., & Schultz, W. (2001). Dopamine responses
comply with basic assumptions of formal learning theory. Nature, 412,
43–48.
Watanabe, M. (1996). Reward expectancy in primate prefrontal neurons.
Nature, 382, 629–632.
Watkins, C. J. C. H., & Dayan, P. (1992). Technical note: Q-learning.
Machine Learning, 8, 279–292.
Wilson, F. A. W., & Rolls, E. T. (1993). The effects of stimulus novelty and
familiarity on neuronal activity in the amygdala of monkeys performing
recognition memory tasks. Experimental Brain Research, 93, 367–382.
Yim, C. Y., & Mogenson, G. J. (1989). Low doses of accumbens dopamine
modulate amygdala suppression of spontaneous exploratory activity in
rats. Brain Research, 477, 202–210.
S. Ishii et al. / Neural Networks 15 (2002) 665–687 687